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We focus on Timothy Williamson’s recent attack on the epistemological significance of the a 
priori–a posteriori distinction,1 and offer an explanation of why, fundamentally, it does not 
succeed. We begin (§1, 2) by setting out Williamson’s core argument, and some of the 
background to it and move to consider (§3, 4) two lines of conciliatory response to it—
conciliatory in that neither questions the central analogy on which Williamson's argument 
depends. We claim, setting aside a methodological challenge (§5) to which Williamson owes an 
answer, that no satisfactory such reconciliation is in prospect. Rather, as we then argue, —and it 
is on this that we base our overall negative assessment of his argument—Williamson’s core 
analogy is flawed by an oversight (§§6-8). We conclude (§9) with some brief reflections on 
Williamson’s ideas about the imagination as a source of knowledge. 
 Our principal conclusion is only that Williamson’s argument fails to perform as 
advertised. A constructive case for confidence, to the contrary, that the intuitive contrast between 
a priori and a posteriori reflects something of fundamental epistemological significance is 
prefigured in our final section, but will not be elaborated here. 
 
§1 Background 
The history of philosophy attests that there has seemed to many to be a genuine 
distinction between judgements warranted by empirical evidence and those warranted ‘a 
priori’. Scepticism about whether anything substantive is marked by this tendency has 
often — maybe usually—been driven by background theoretical assumptions. The 
holistic empiricism of Quine’s “Two Dogmas” is one salient example. Another is 
epistemological externalism. John Hawthorne, for example, has written that 
 If an epistemological distinction fails to carve at the epistemological joints, then it is not 
worthy of serious and protracted discussion. The residual issue whether the putative 
distinction is incoherent or merely gerrymandered ought not to strike anyone as 
especially important. My own externalist commitments – epistemological and semantic – 
lead me to think that the a priori / a posteriori distinction is not a practically natural one, 
and hence that its importance to epistemology has been grossly overestimated.2  
Hawthorne goes on to argue that, from an externalist standpoint,3 there are serious 
difficulties with each of two kinds of common characterisation4 of a priori knowledge in 
capturing the intuitively desired extension. However, even his argument is successful in 
                                                        
1 Williamson (2013). All numbered page references are to this text unless otherwise stated. 
2 Hawthorne (2007: 201)  
3 Specifically, from a standpoint that regards safety—where, roughly, a true belief is formed safely just if 
formed by the method actually used, it could not easily have been mistaken—as necessary for knowledge. 
4 Respectively, environment-independence —the idea that a process warrants a belief a priori just if its 
execution would provide a warrant for that belief no matter what the environment—and experience-
independence—the idea that warrant for a belief is a priori provided it is acquired in a way that does not 
essentially involve sense-experience. 
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its own terms — something which we offer no opinion about here—it merits emphasis 
that any externalistically-driven line of attack on the a priori is tendentious. The classical 
a priori, encompassing judgments about valid inference, basic arithmetic, geometry, 
modal status, the phenomenology of colour, and so on, may turn out to be a 
gerrymandered category, but the common phenomenology of cognition in all the basic 
examples is one of reflective intellection, perhaps aided by thought-experiment and 
imagination.  Persuading oneself that seven plus five is twelve, that no surface can be 
simultaneously red and green all over, or that modus ponens is valid, seems to be 
something we can do in a perfectly epistemically responsible fashion in the armchair, 
with our eyes closed, purely by the exercise of certain intellectual and imaginative 
routines. In short, the classical a priori supplies perhaps the most natural home for the 
fostering of internalist conceptions of epistemic warrant—conceptions that hold that the 
attainment of warrant is grounded in internal mental processing of which agents can be 
fully aware in normal self-consciousness and for which they can take full responsibility. 
Such conceptions may indeed prove to be problematic when generalised. But the 
dialectical position is that wherever internal conscious mental processing is ordinarily 
recognised as an unconditional—though maybe defeasible—source of epistemic warrant, 
then that is a strike in favour of at least a local epistemic internalism. The credibility of a 
general epistemic externalism thus depends in its being able either to account for the a 
priori, or to discredit it independently. Doubts about it that presuppose externalism—
which in effect merely draw on problems associated with making sense of it in externalist 
terms—ought to be regarded as dialectically ineffective.  
 Williamson, like Hawthorne, is of course of well-documented, strong externalist 
sympathies. But one consideration that makes his critique of the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction potentially much more interesting is that he does not present his central 
argument as relying on any externalist assumptions but at least appears to aim at a broad 
theoretical neutrality.5 
§2 Williamson’s critique outlined 
There is another consideration that adds to the interest of Williamson’s argument: the fact 
that he is not sceptical about the reality of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. He is quite 
content to grant that there is a distinction, which people are capable of picking up from 
examples and applying non-collusively to new cases in ways which produce broad 
agreement with each other – in short, that there is, as he puts it, a “bottom-up” route into 
                                                        
5  We say “appears” because there is no passage in the paper that explicitly expresses this aim. But the 
following footnote (number 2, p. 310), though it flags a switch of attention from knowledge to jusitification 
— as if attention to the latter was somehow the province of internalism—may be thought indicative:  
Many contemporary epistemologists, especially those of an internalist bent, treat the [a priori/a 
posteriori] distinction as primarily a classification of forms of justification rather than of 
knowledge. For reasons explained in Williamson (2000), I treat the classification of forms of 
knowledge as primary. Friends of justification should not find much difficulty in reworking the 
arguments of this chapter in their terms.  
We will return to the question whether Williamson’s’ dialectic really is free of externalist presupposition 
later. 
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capacities of productive, non-collusive, broadly consensual judgements about what is a 
priori and what is a posteriori.   
 The thrust of Williamson's critique is twofold: first, that the profile of the 
distinction which we thus draw bottom-up does not coincide with any theoretically 
important or explanatory epistemological distinction; second, that standard official 
characterisations of the distinction — characterisations that proceed “top-down”, as he 
likes to say — misrepresent the role played by experience in the kind of cognitive 
processing characteristic of (many?) a priori judgements, and fail to align with the 
distinction as  drawn bottom-up. Like Hawthorne, Williamson characterises the general 
thrust of his critique as to the effect that the traditional a priori/a posteriori distinction 
fails to “carve at the epistemological joints”.   
 To elaborate. The traditional understanding of the a priori/a posteriori distinction 
proceeds on the assumption, commonly accepted, that experience can play two quite 
different roles in knowledge and justification: one evidential, the other enabling.  
Experience plays an evidential role when it provides the agent with her evidence for a 
certain judgement; it plays a merely enabling role when it is required only for the 
acquisition of the concepts drawn on in an understanding of the proposition that she is 
otherwise warranted in judging true. Since the justification of any proposition draws on 
an understanding of the concepts configured in it, and since concept-acquisition is an 
empirical process, defenders of the a priori are therefore normally willing to grant that 
justification a priori is not justification which is “independent of experience” in its 
enabling role.  Their thought is rather that, in such justification, experience plays no 
evidential role.   
 So much is familiar.  Williamson considers the following two propositions: 
 
(Crimson)  All crimson things are red 
(Who's Who)  All recent volumes of Who’s Who are red 
 
The traditional view is that the role played by experience in acquiring justification for 
(Crimson) is merely enabling: experience is required to form the concepts, crimson and 
red. But once equipped with the concepts, so runs the traditional thought, agents are able 
to acquire justification for (Crimson) simply by reflection on the colours involved, 
without any need for additional experience, in particular, without having to seek out 
crimson things and verify whether they are red or not. By contrast, it doesn’t seem that an 
agent can get justification for (Who's Who) without checking the colour of recent 
volumes of Who’s Who. In addition to the experiences required for the formation of the 
concepts involved in (Who's Who), some kind of empirical investigation is called for.  
The heart of Williamson's argument is a direct challenge to this way of looking at these 
examples.  
 Williamson imagines a character — Norman — who is trained ostensively in the 
use of the words, "red" and "crimson", independently of each other, encountering both 
positive and negative samples of each. We are to suppose that his training goes well and 
that he becomes expert in the simple classificatory use of both expressions. His training 
does not involve any consideration of the proposition, (Crimson), and now he is invited to 
take a view about it.  In Williamson's view, he can competently do so purely by an 
exercise of the capacities of visual imagination, which, it may plausibly be supposed, his 
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training will have fitted him with: he has only visually to conjure up a sample of crimson 
and then “within the imaginative supposition” recognise that it is indeed red.  No 
recollection of any specific previous encounters with red or crimson things is needed. 
And since Norman’s performance may be supposed to have been “sufficiently skillful”, 
and the background conditions to it to have been perfectly normal, his consequent 
judgement that (Crimson) is true should count as knowledgeable. 
 This may seem to pass muster as an outline of how (Crimson) and similar 
propositions may be recognised to be true a priori in something like the 'bottom-up' 
understanding of the notion.6  The sting comes when, according to Williamson, we note 
that exactly the same kind of reflective, imaginative routine is, in relevantly similar 
circumstances, at the service of knowledge of a 'bottom-up' a posteriori proposition like 
(Who's Who). We have only to suppose that Norman has successfully undergone a similar 
ostensive teaching in the correct classificatory use of the expressions, “red” and “recent 
volume of Who's Who” — similar in that he has encountered both positive and negative 
examples of the application of each, that they have been explained independently of each 
other, and that the teaching has involved no explicit consideration of (Who's Who).  In 
order to come to a judgement of that proposition, Williamson avers, all Norman has to do 
is, similarly, to conjure up in his visual imagination a sample of a recent volume of Who's 
Who and correctly judge the colour that it is therein represented as having. Once again, 
provided the performance is sufficiently skilful, and assuming that the background 
conditions are normal, there is no reason to deny that Norman's judgement is 
knowledgeable.7 
                                                        
6 Below (§6), we will question whether it really does pass muster. 
7 For the benefit of readers without immediate access to Williamson’s text, it may be helpful to quote the 
relevant passage in full:  
Suppose that Norman acquires the words 'crimson' and 'red' independently of each other, by ostensive means. 
He learns ‘crimson’ by being shown examples to which it applies and samples to which it does not apply, and 
told which are which. He learns ‘red’ in a parallel but causally independent way. He is not taught any rule 
like (Crimson), connecting ‘crimson’ and ‘red’. Through practice and feedback, he becomes very skilful in 
judging by eye whether something is crimson, and whether something is red. Now Norman is asked whether 
(Crimson) holds. He has not previously considered any such question. Nevertheless, he can quite easily come 
to know (Crimson), without looking at any crimson things to check whether they are red, or even 
remembering any crimson things to check whether they are red, or making any other new exercise of 
perception or memory of particular coloured things. Rather, he assents to (Crimson) after brief reflection on 
the colours crimson and red, along something like the following lines. First, Norman uses his skill in making 
visual judgments with ‘crimson’ to visually imagine a sample of crimson. Then he uses his skill in making 
visual judgments with ‘red’ to judge, within the imaginative supposition, “It is red”. This involves a general 
human capacity to transpose ‘online’ cognitive skills originally developed in perception into corresponding 
“offline” cognitive skills subsequently applied in imagination. That capacity is essential to much of our 
thinking, for instance when we reflectively assess conditionals in making contingency plans (See Williamson 
2007: 137-78). No episodic memories of prior experiences, for example of crimson things, play any role. As 
a result of the process Norman accepts (Crimson). Since his performance was sufficiently skilful, background 
conditions were normal, and so on, he thereby comes to know (Crimson). 
 Naturally, that broad-brush description neglects many issues. For instance, what prevents Norman 
from imagining a peripheral shade of crimson? If one shade of crimson is red, it does not follow that all are. 
The relevant cognitive skills must be taken to include sensitivity to such matters. If normal speakers associate 
colour terms with central prototypes, as many psychologists believe, their use in the imaginative exercise 
may enhance its reliability. The proximity in colour space of prototypical crimson to prototypical red is one 
indicator, but does not suffice by itself, since it does not discriminate between “All crimson things are red” 
(true) and “All red things are crimson” (false). Various cognitive mechanisms can be postulated to do the job. 
We need not fill in the details, since for present purposes what matters is the overall picture. So far, we may 
accept it as a sketch of the cognitive processes underlying Norman's a priori knowledge of (Crimson).   
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So, Williamson is offering an example where, so he claims, the very same type of 
cognitive process provides justification, and indeed knowledge, for both (Crimson), that 
all crimson things are red, and (Who's Who), that all recent volumes of Who’s Who are 
red. If he is right, he has shown, at the least, that there is no important cognitive 
difference between one way of knowing the usually regarded a priori proposition, 
(Crimson), and one way of knowing the usually regarded a posteriori proposition, (Who's 
Who). But of course there is an asymmetry in the traditional understanding of the notions.  
While an a posteriori proposition, traditionally regarded, is one which can only be known 
by, broadly speaking, empirical means, an a priori proposition, while it can be known a 
priori, may also be knowable a posteriori. So before Williamson's example, even if we 
find no problem with his description of it, can put any kind of pressure on the distinction, 
it needs to be argued that Norman's cognitive processes as described are not properly 
regarded as constituting an a posteriori mode of knowledge-acquisition. We’ll come back 
to this. 
 Williamson wants the example to show two things. Remember that he accepts that 
there is an intelligible “bottom-up” distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  
Accepting such a distinction, the first intended point of the example is that there need be 
very little difference in what goes on when, respectively, an agent competently comes to 
know, a priori, that all crimson things are red and when he comes to know the, by 
bottom-up standards, a posteriori proposition that all recent copies of Who’s Who are red, 
and hence very little difference between (one kind of) putatively a priori cognitive 
processing and (one kind of) a posteriori cognitive processing. This point, again, depends 
on accepting that what Norman, as described, does in coming to know (Crimson) does 
properly count as coming to know it a priori.   
 The second point Williamson intends the example to make is that the traditional 
distinction between the evidential and the enabling role of experience in cognition misses 
an important third way in which experience can be involved in the acquisition of 
justification. This third way is tied to the knowledge-productive use of imagination in the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 Now compare the case of (Who's Who). Norman is as already described. He learns the complex 
phrase “recent volumes of Who’s Who” by learning “recent”, “volume”, “Who’s Who” and so on. He is not 
taught any rule like (Who's Who), connecting “recent volume of Who’s Who” and “red”. Through practice 
and feedback he becomes very skilful in judging by eye whether something is a recent volume of Who’s Who 
(by reading the title), and whether something is red. Now Norman is asked whether (Who's Who) holds. He 
has not previously considered any such question. Nevertheless, he can quite easily come to know (Who's 
Who), without looking at any recent volumes of Who’s Who to check whether they are red, or even 
remembering any recent volumes of Who’s Who to check whether they are red, or any other new exercise of 
perception or memory. Rather he assents to (Who's Who) after brief reflection along something like the 
following lines. First Norman uses his skill in making visual judgments with “recent volume of Who’s Who” 
to visually imagine a recent volume of Who’s Who. Then he uses his skill in making visual judgments with 
“red” to judge, within the imaginative supposition, “It is red”. This involves the same general human capacity 
as before to transpose “online” cognitive skills originally developed in perception into corresponding 
“offline” cognitive skills subsequently applied in imagination. No episodic memories of prior experiences, 
for example of recent volumes of Who’s Who, play any role. As a result of the process Norman accepts 
(Who's Who). Since his performance was sufficiently skilful, background conditions were normal, and so on, 
he thereby comes to know (Who's Who).   
 As before, the broad-brush description neglects many issues. For instance, what prevents Norman 
from imagining an untypical recent volume of Who’s Who?  If one recent volume of Who’s Who is red, it 
does not follow that all are. The relevant cognitive skills must be taken to include sensitivity to such matters. 
As before, Norman must use his visual recognitional capacities offline in ways that respect untypical as well 
as typical cases. We may accept that as a sketch of cognitive processes underlying Norman’s a posteriori 
knowledge of (Who's Who). Williamson (2013: 295-296). 
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kind of "offline" application of skills acquired through perception that Norman is meant 
to illustrate. Continue to allow that a way has indeed been described whereby Norman 
can come to know that all crimson things are red. Williamson contrasts Norman's case 
with that of Norbert, a competent native speaker of English who has acquired the words 
“red” and “crimson” in a way similar to Norman, but has not yet had very much practice 
and feedback in classifying things as “crimson” or “not crimson”.  We can imagine, 
though, says Williamson, that Norbert usually gives the correct verdicts with both “red” 
and “crimson” at least when applying his skill of making colour judgments “online”— 
that is, in response to real external cases. So, the suggestion is, we can suppose him 
linguistically competent with both words: he has the concepts, red and crimson, and there 
is thus no question but that he grasps the proposition, (Crimson).  However we are to 
suppose that Norbert is relatively inexperienced in the application of these concepts, so 
that though competent, he is less skilful than Norman when it comes to imagining a 
crimson sample; and thus he is not able to convince himself that (Crimson) is true just by 
an exercise of the visual imagination. We can suppose that he comes to no view about the 
issue.  But now, since both Norbert and Norman have had the experience necessary to 
grasp the relevant concepts but only Norman has managed to get to know (Crimson) by 
imagining a crimson sample, it seems that we have to say that the role of experience in 
Norman’s acquisition of knowledge is more than the merely enabling role that it also 
plays for Norbert. The merely enabling role of experience is not enough to underwrite the 
acquisition of knowledge of (Crimson) by means of the visual imagination. Something 
more is needed, something that Norman has but Norbert lacks. What Norbert lacks and 
Norman has is sufficient experience to “hone and calibrate his skills in applying the terms 
“crimson” and “red” to the point where he could carry out the imaginative exercise 
successfully”.8   
 So the role of experience in Norman's route to knowledge of (Crimson) is more 
than enabling, as that is traditionally understood. But that it is also less than evidential 
simply follows from the description of the case: any direct contribution by perception, 
memory, testimony or any other experiential source was excluded from the start. Given 
the close analogy between the cognitive processing involved in (Who's Who) and that 
involved in (Crimson), Williamson thus takes himself to have shown that the role of 
experience in both cases is more than purely enabling and less than strictly evidential.   
 Williamson's contention, accordingly, is that the traditional distinction between 
cognitive processes in which experience plays an evidential role and cognitive processes 
in which it plays a merely enabling role is too crude — that there are significant cognitive 
processes, culminating in knowledge, in which the role of experience is more than 
enabling but less than evidential. Hence the traditional kind of "top-down" explanation of 
the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is flawed. Moreover some 
cognitive processing culminating in what, by bottom-up standards, counts as a priori 
knowledge is effectively identical to the kind of processing involved in coming to what, 
by bottom-up standards, count as examples of a posteriori knowledge. The traditional 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, explicated as it standardly is, thus 
“fails to carve at the epistemological joints”.  
 
                                                        
8 Williamson (2013: 297). 
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§3 Conciliatory Responses to Williamson’s Critique (I): the Synthetic A Priori 
What should we think about this? A first reaction is that Williamson needs to show that 
the way he outlines of knowing (Crimson) is in some way exemplary – that it represents, 
as it were, not merely a legitimate but a prototypical way whereby knowledge a priori, 
both of (Crimson) and other central examples of the traditional a priori, can be achieved. 
If there are other ways of knowing (Crimson) which are also plausibly a priori and are not 
tantamount to Norman's way, then it seems that the theoretical utility of the traditional 
distinction need be under no immediate challenge by the example, and might yet be 
vindicated. We could allow that Williamson has shown that the role which experience 
can play in knowledge-acquisition is more complex than allowed for by the 
enabling/evidential dichotomy and that we need to recognise the, as it were, intermediate 
role that experience can play in honing the skills involved in “offline” exercises of the 
imagination. But we could propose in response that Williamson's observation calls for 
complication, not rejection; that we need a tripartite division. There is the traditional a 
priori: knowledge acquired by means in which experience plays only an enabling role. 
There is the traditional a posteriori, in which experience plays both an enabling and an 
evidential role. And there is a third category in which experience plays both an enabling 
and the third, intermediate role described by Williamson, but plays no evidential role.   
 It's in keeping with the spirit of this response to grant that the visual imagination 
is indeed a cognitive skill that draws on experience but does not deploy the evidence of 
experience in any straightforward way. And this, for all we are going to argue to the 
contrary, may be an important insight. The idea that experience can “hone” the use of the 
conceptual skills we employ in the imagination, and in consequence can put agents in a 
position to conduct and learn from thought experiments in various ways that would not 
otherwise be feasible, should seem seem well worth exploring. One interesting issue in 
this connection might be whether there are propositions, or subject-matters, that are 
characteristically associated with knowledge achieved by the intermediate route, in the 
way in which the evidence of experience is characteristically associated with ordinary 
empirical propositions, and the deployment simply of conceptual grasp is associated with 
the traditional analytic propositions. Perhaps Williamson has reminded us, in short, of 
something characteristic about the methods of cognition that are relevant to the traditional 
synthetic a priori. In that case, it will simply have been a mistake — traceable perhaps to 
the legacy of positivism and the empiricists — to think of the a priori as exhausted by 
methods of cognition that demand only conceptual reflection or acquaintance with 
meanings.   
 This accommodating response, then, would hold that the effect of Williamson's 
argument, if sustained, should be to remind us that the traditional way of thinking about 
the a priori that comes down to us from the positivists, and more generally, the “linguistic 
theory” of the matter popular in the mid-twentieth century, is seriously impoverished:  
that a richer epistemology needs to be invoked to accommodate the kinds of cognitive 
routine – imagination, thought-experimentation, and whatever else careful attention the 
phenomenology of basic a priori conviction might disclose – involved in the full range of 
instances of the a priori that we allow “bottom-up”. Propositions like “3+2=5”, when 
suggested by a diagram, or “All cubes have twelve edges”, when suggested by a count of 
the edges of an imaginary cube, or “Nothing can be both red and green all over”, when 
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suggested by the phenomenology of colour experience, all come within that range. The 
picture that would emerge would then be one in which the traditional domain of the a 
priori would in effect be split in two: on the one hand come propositions like “All 
bachelors are unmarried”, typically knowable simply by analytic reflection, and in which 
the use of the visual or other forms of imagination plays no essential role; and on the 
other hand come propositions like “All cubes have twelve edges” which may be 
knowable by pure conceptual reflection and deduction from definitions, but which also, 
and indeed perhaps more usually, are known with the help of visualisation and attention 
to the figures visualised.   
 A more satisfactory taxonomy, it may be suggested, might accordingly involve 
three types of propositions:    
(i)  Propositions that can be known only through processes in which experience plays 
an evidential role – ordinary empirical propositions; 
(ii)  Propositions that can be known through methods in which experience is involved 
merely in an enabling, concept-supplying role; — the traditional analytic a priori; and  
(iii)  Propositions that cannot be known merely on the basis of grasp of the concepts 
involved but can be known without reliance on experiential evidence, by routines which 
involve essential play with thought-experimentation or imagination and which rest on 
experience only in the intermediate role that Williamson gestures at.  
Of course this response to Williamson’s argument is very much not in the spirit of his 
own response. Still, it might be prompted by his reflections and it might represent a 
correct step in epistemology even if his argument is wrong.9  
 However it is, as the reader will likely be impatient to point out, untenable if he is 
right. The problem with it is, of course, its failure to take the measure of the putative 
applicability of the method of cognition described by Williamson to the proposition 
(Who's Who), that all recent volumes of Who’s Who are red. It is surely just too much of a 
stretch of the intent of the traditional distinction to allow that such a matter can be known 
a priori, that it is an example of the synthetic a priori. It's one thing to grant that the 
domain of the analytic incorporates too narrow an epistemology of the a priori, and 
overlooks the intermediate role that experience-honed imagination can play in furnishing 
genuine reflective knowledge. To grant that much does indeed call for no more than 
complication of the traditional distinction. But the distinction is surely not merely 
complicated but subverted if we wind up counting Norman's knowledge of (Who's Who) 
as a genuine species of a priori knowledge as well. Indeed, although Williamson's official 
line is that his argument comes not to bury the traditional distinction but merely to 
question its theoretical significance, he surely understates its force. If there really is no 
relevant epistemological difference between Norman's ways of coming to know 
(Crimson) and (Who's Who) as described, the conclusion has to be that in a wide class of 
cases, the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is a distinction without a 
difference, that it is no distinction at all. From this perspective, Williamson’s 
concessiveness to the bottom-up distinction — his willingness to allow that there is a 
distinction, although one of no theoretical or explanatory interest, and permitting of no 
                                                        
9 See Jenkins/Kasaki (2015: §§ 4-5) for some suggestions about an analogy between the roles that Kant and 
Williamson assign to imagination, and the possible complication of the enabling/evidential distinction. 
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systematic account — may impress as a relatively (uncharacteristically!) modest response 
to his argument.  Everything else being sound, the conclusion seems justified that there is 
no real distinction: that, in our bottom-up judgments about the a priori and the a 
posteriori, while we largely march in step with each other, we track no objective divide. 
 
§4 Conciliatory Responses to Williamson’s Critique (II): Extending the A Posteriori 
So far we have been concerned with responses to Williamson’s argument which grant 
that there is a good analogy between Norman's respective ways of knowing (Crimson) 
and (Who's Who), but incline to regard that way of knowing, generally characterised, as 
belonging in spirit with the a priori as traditionally conceived. There is, of course, as 
briefly signalled earlier, the opposite way of receiving Williamson's case: allow the 
analogy but propose, instead, that what it shows is that some apparently reflective 
methods of cognition are actually better classified as a posteriori — that knowledge that 
all crimson things are red, when achieved in Norman's way, is, no less than knowledge 
achieved in that way of (Who's Who), a kind of a posteriori knowledge.  
 One way of elaborating this response10 is to argue that Norman's successfully 
conjuring an image of a crimson shade, or of a volume of Who’s Who, should be 
reckoned to be an instance of recollection – that is, as something involving memory of 
what crimson things, and volumes of Who’s Who, look like. (There would, to be sure, still 
be a difference in the modal status of what was thereby recollected — crimson things 
necessarily look like that; volumes of Who’s Who do not.  But almost everyone now 
allows that necessary propositions can be known a posteriori.) It is true that no episodic 
memory need be involved — no memory of any particular occasion on which a crimson 
thing, or a volume of Who’s Who, was encountered—but there certainly is such a thing as 
remembering, based on acquaintance, what something, or some kind of thing, looks like. 
And in general such memory need involve no recollection of any particular episode of 
acquaintance with the thing or with an instance of the kind. If, in a temporary total 
amnesia, you lose all remembrance of the events of your past but still find yourself able 
to find your way to your house and recognise it as such, that is knowledge based on 
acquaintance and stored in memory. Isn't it knowledge of this genre that plausibly 
underpins Norman's achievements? It is thus questionable whether Williamson produces 
any real argument for the claim that memory is not involved in Norman's successes. And 
if it is allowed to be so, then — viewing memory simply as a retrospective recovery of 
information once yielded by experience —the claim that Norman's method of cognition is 
a posteriori even in the case of (Crimson) may seem to have legs.11 
                                                        
10 A different way of developing a response of the same shape is proposed by Albert Casullo (this volume). 
We think that Casullo’s proposal also succumbs to the objection to be lodged below. 
11 Expectably, Williamson anticipates an appeal to generic memory. He writes with respect to (Crimson): 
“One interpretation of the example is that, although Norman’s knowledge of (Crimson) does not depend on 
episodic memory, and he may even lack all episodic memory of any relevant particular colour experiences, 
he nevertheless retains from such experiences generic factual memories of what crimson things look like 
and of what red things look like, on which knowledge of (Crimson) depends”. But then he counters that 
“such reclassification is a risky strategy for defenders of the a priori-a posteriori distinction. Instead, it 
might be proposed [...] that the only residue of Norman’s colour experience active in his knowledge of 
(Crimson) may be his skill in recognising and imagining colours.” Likewise with respect to (Who’s Who), 
he writes: “Norman’s knowledge of (Who’s Who) can be envisaged in parallel to his knowledge of 
(Crimson) as just envisaged. [...] The only residue of his experience of recent volumes of Who’s Who active 
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 The distinction is well taken, but does it help? The real problem with any “Both 
are a posteriori” response to Williamson’s analogy is the shrinking that it threatens of the 
domain of the traditional a priori. In particular, if appeal to the reflective imagination is to 
count as conferring a priori knowledge only in cases where no episode-unspecific 
recollection is involved of what items are like which instantiate the concepts that the 
imagination makes play with, how many of basic arithmetical, geometrical, and a host of 
other types of claim are going to survive as knowable a priori? Even the apriority of 
traditionally acknowledged analytic claims will come under threat in any cases where 
understanding their key ingredient concepts involves knowing— generic memory— what 
things that fall under them “are like”. Perhaps we might yet be able to stabilise some 
notion of the a priori within the boundaries grudgingly recognised by J.S Mill – the 
trivially verbal and definitional. And those who, contra Williamson, incline to think of 
the a priori as an important epistemological category might still be right after such a 
restriction —for recognition of truth based purely on the grasp of meanings does seem to 
be a real phenomenon, and is not easily explained. But proponents of the classical a priori 
surely didn’t intend the notion to have so meagre an extent.  
§5 A Methodological Aside  
At this point, though, there may seem to be something methodologically suspect about 
the argument. Let's take stock. The classical account was that a priori propositions are 
those that may be known in a way which depends on experience only in a concept-
enabling role. This failed to get the extension of the bottom-up distinction right: 
Williamson found cases where the role of experience is not merely enabling, but which 
the bottom-up distinction classifies as a priori. The accommodating response then said:  
Count these Williamsonian cases as synthetic a priori, and broaden the category of the a 
priori accordingly. In response, Williamson can point out that in that case “All recent 
copies of Who’s Who are red”, as known by Norman, counts as (synthetic) a priori too. 
That seems too much to accept. So the accommodating response, in its turn, misdescribes 
the extension of the bottom-up distinction. And now we are invited to conclude that the 
bottom-up distinction is no objective distinction, that it admits of no systematic 
theoretical account, and is fit for no explanatory work. But why should we draw this 
conclusion? It is certainly not true in general that when philosophical accounts are 
proposed to rationalise and explain a distinction that we draw intuitively, and then prove 
repeatedly to over- or under-extend, we conclude that the original distinction is empty, or 
of no real theoretical interest. The more common— and certainly another possible— 
reaction is to conclude that the trouble lies at the level of the proposed accounts. That 
indeed is exactly the conclusion that Williamson himself has drawn in response to the 
long line of counter-examples to various proposals about knowledge spawned by the 
original Gettier cases. There his own recommended conclusion is that there is in the end 
no saying, at a reductive level, what knowledge consists in: that it should be taken as an 
epistemological primitive. That is a far cry from Williamson's conclusion in the present 
instance. Williamson concludes that the a priori is theoretically uninteresting; whereas in 
the case of knowledge his conclusion is that the notion of knowledge is primitive and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in his knowledge of (Who’s Who) is his skill in recognising and imagining such volumes.” (All quotes from 
Williamson 2013 at p. 298). We agree that the strategy is “risky” — for the reason we are about to explain. 
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fundamental in epistemology. What breaks the tie? Why doesn’t Williamson simply 
conclude that we presently have no adequate account of the a priori, and that we need to 
try harder — but mindful that we may have in the end to conclude that this notion too 
gestures at something primitive and fundamental in epistemology?   
 It’s a good question. When all attempts at a theoretical reconstruction of a notion 
seemingly fail to get the intuitive extension right, there is always the option of concluding 
that there is underlying our use of it no consistent, proper rationale – that any broad 
consensus exhibited in our practice with it is to be explained not in terms of our detection 
of some real property of (epistemic) situations, but in other terms. (Deflationary and 
expressivist accounts offer just such explanations.) Granted, if one took this view of 
knowledge, there would still be a “bottom-up” notion, manifest in our practice with the 
term. But Williamson must allow that, if no more is said, the response to the post-Gettier 
history is available that knowledge is without explanatory interest, something of which no 
account is to be given, and that serious epistemological work should employ other 
notions. This is exactly the conclusion that he wants to draw about the a priori. What has 
the a priori done, in Williamson's view, to deserve such a conclusion, when the notion of 
knowledge, in his view, doesn’t? 
§6 Questioning the Core Analogy (I)—worries about (Crimson). 
So far, we have been concerned with the significance of, and possible responses to, 
Williamson's analogy on the assumption that it should be sustained: that imaginative 
reflection, unaugmented by additional empirical evidence, can be equally productive of 
knowledge of (Who's Who) as of (Crimson). Our finding so far is that neither of two 
possible conciliatory responses seems satisfactory. But should Williamson's analogy be 
sustained in the first place? It is important, obviously, that the parallel between Norman’s 
cognition in the two cases be given in sufficient detail to make it plausible not merely that 
he has done much the same thing but that in both cases he has done something by which 
he is properly convinced, and which — if nothing else goes wrong — could properly 
constitute the acquisition of knowledge.   
 It is here that, on closer inspection, the shoe begins to pinch —that the analogy 
begins to seem procrustean. To begin with, Williamson's description of the case of 
(Crimson) leaves it completely unclear what role the imagination plays in warranting the 
step from an appreciation of the impression of the visualised patch of crimson to the 
generality of the judgement concerning all crimson things. As a first step, one could say 
that, before any belief about crimson things in general can be warranted by this process, 
one needs some kind of assurance that the patch of crimson visualised is properly 
stereotypical of crimson – that it somehow typifies all shades of crimson. And this 
information does not seem to be something that merely imagining a particular shade can 
deliver: rather, Norman will need some independent grip on the spread of crimson in the 
colour band, as it were, before he can be in position to be assured that the shade he 
visualises is in some way central or typical of them.   
 Williamson of course acknowledges a worry in this vicinity.12 His emphasis at 
this point on Norman's "appropriate cognitive skills" suggests he might reply by insisting 
                                                        
12 “Naturally, that broad-brush description neglects many issues.  For instance, what prevents Norman from 
imagining a peripheral shade of crimson? If one shade of crimson is red, it does not follow that all are. The 
relevant cognitive skills must be taken to include sensitivity to such matters. If normal speakers associate 
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that there is no evident requirement that Norman should know that the visualised patch is 
stereotypical – that it is enough merely that it be so, and that this can be ensured not by 
information that he possesses but by his well-honed imaginative skills. If, though, that is 
the response that Williamson himself would favour, then we — and he — should 
remember that we are here being presented with an argument that is supposed to be 
neutral on the opposition between externalist and internalist conceptions of knowledge 
and justification. Such a response is not neutral: it depends on a reliance upon the idea 
that the exercise of a certain kind of reliable imaginative skill can be sufficient to 
underwrite knowledge even in circumstances where the agents themselves have no reason 
to suppose that they do indeed have such a skill. 
 Setting that aside, however, there is further cause for dissatisfaction with 
Williamson's description of the case. It is crucial to his purposes that Norman fully grasps 
the concepts of crimson and red, and yet prior to the episode in his imagination, that it 
have been an open question to him whether all crimson things are red. The question is 
how, merely by imagining what is as a matter of fact a stereotypical shade of crimson, he 
somehow succeeds in closing the question off. What is it about the process that mandates 
his conviction? Why, now that for the first time he considers the question, and having 
visualised what is as a matter of fact a stereotypical shade of crimson, is Norman rightly 
inclined to discount the possibility that there might be other shades of crimson that are 
not red? How does the imaginative exercise make it plausible to him that there are no 
such shades?  
 Williamson himself said, in setting up the case, that it has been by practice and 
feedback that Norman has become skilful in judging by eye whether something is 
crimson and whether something is red. What kind of feedback did he have in mind?  
Does it include cases where Norman has overextended the use of “crimson” among red 
things and been corrected? Williamson himself seems to imply so.13 But if that kind of 
thing has been Norman's experience, then his coming to knowledge that all crimson 
things are red doesn’t need the imaginative exercise described; rather it can be grounded 
in his linguistic experience – he has been advised, by example and correction, that correct 
use of “crimson” is restricted to a band, vaguely demarcated no doubt, within the 
determinable colour red. Maybe the episode in imagination plays a causal, or triggering 
role – maybe it reminds Norman in some way of the constraints on proper practice with 
“crimson”; but it is hard to see that it stands to teach him anything.   
We had better suppose, therefore, that Norman has had no such feedback. He has 
merely become adept, by practice, in applying “crimson” to crimson things and “red” to 
red things. But how in that case, merely by visualising a typical case of crimson and, as it 
were, observing its redness, can Norman reach a rational conviction that all crimson 
things are red? Something epistemologically essential is clearly missing here: suppose the 
question had been, conversely, whether all red things are crimson, and that Norman had 
done exactly the same in response – imagined a shade of red that, as it might well be, was 
                                                                                                                                                                     
colour terms with central prototypes, as many psychologists believe, their use in the imaginative exercise 
may enhance its reliability.” (Williamson 2013: 296), quoted in n. 7 above. 
13 He writes of Norman's education (p. 295), recall, that “he learns ‘crimson’ by being shown examples to 
which it applies and samples to which it does not apply, and told which are which.” It is not explicit, 
though, whether the negative samples for “crimson” included some red ones.  
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crimson; crimson is a pretty typical shade of red after all. What stops him making the 
incorrect, converse generalisation? That would not be a well-founded conviction. But 
Williamson has said nothing, in his account of Norman's cognitive processing, to account 
for the difference.   
 Again, Williamson seems fully aware of exactly this. Recall what he says: 
The proximity in colour space of prototypical crimson to prototypical red is one indicator, 
but does not suffice by itself, since it does not discriminate between “All crimson things 
are red” (true) and “All red things are crimson” (false).  Various cognitive mechanisms 
can be postulated to do the job. We need not fill in the details, since for present purposes 
what matters is the overall picture.14 
This is, to put it kindly, somewhat cavalier. What is “the overall picture”? It is no good 
just gesturing airily at unstated “cognitive mechanisms”. We will not regard Norman as 
knowledgeable about (Crimson) unless he refuses the converse generalisation. Since 
Williamson's description of Norman's cognitive processing underdetermines the latter's 
ability to make this discrimination, it has to be at best incomplete.  But then no relevant 
analogy with the Who’s Who case has yet been made out – for until the missing details, 
are filled in, we don’t know whether or not they might be such as to cause the analogy to 
break down. 
 In general, it seems that before a process of visualisation of a crimson prototype 
and generalisation from its character can lead to knowledge about relations of colour 
inclusion, the agent has to have some anterior conception of the spread of the band of 
shades of which the visualised shade is typical, and the spread of the putative 
determinable colour concerned. The trouble is that if Norman has that anterior 
conception, it's not clear what work the episode in the visual imagination plays in 
securing the knowledge. If he knows already how far the crimson band spreads, as it 
were, and, for its part, how far the red band spreads, then he already knows all he needs 
to know to judge that all crimson things are red while, conversely, not all red things are 
crimson. The interesting question will then concern the source of those two pieces of 
knowledge. But whatever it may be, it looks as though that is where Norman's knowledge 
of colour inclusions and exclusions is grounded. What if any part may be played by the 
kind of episode in visual imagination—rather than, say, explicit training in the relevant 
linguistic boundaries—that Williamson describes, is, as far as his discussion succeeds in 
taking matters, quite moot. 
 In summary: Williamson’s idea was that skills of imagination, honed by 
perceptual experience, can play the same kind of role in the acquisition of knowledge of 
propositions as diverse as “All crimson things are red” and “All recent volumes of Who’s 
Who are red”. But the effect of the foregoing is that his discussions have left it quite 
unclear what role the visual imagination does play in the epistemology of the former.  





                                                        
14 Williamson (2013: 296). 
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§7 A better example for Williamson’s purpose? 
Arguably, though, this is a drawback of the particular example that Williamson selected 
and can be finessed. Let's switch to one that we offer as more plausible for his purposes.  
Consider the following:   
(Square)  All squares are diamonds. 
In this case there is a much more salient role that the visual imagination can play in 
inducing conviction, which is relatively easy to describe. Suppose that Norman has 
acquired the concepts square and diamond in the kind of ostensive way that Williamson 
suggests and now considers for the first time whether (Square) is true. He visually 
imagines a stereotypical square and then realigns it in the imagination by rotating it 
through 45 degrees in such a way that it then impresses as diamond-shaped. Satisfied 
with this, he assents to (Square).   
 Questions still remain to be answered about this process, of course. There is still 
the problem of the erroneous converse generalisation — Norman might as well have 
started with a visually imagined picture of a square resting, so to say, on one of its 
corners and then, realigning it in the imagination to present as a square, have concluded 
that all diamonds are squares. So something needs to be said about the original process to 
explain why it is productive of knowledge although the latter would not be. There is still 
an issue of incompleteness, therefore, in the description. And there is also the problem of 
generalisation – why does Norman get to be justifiably certain that all squares are 
diamonds, rather than merely that this particular square, re-configured in his imagination, 
is a diamond? But at least it is clearer in this case how a process taking place in the 
imagination intelligibly prompts the belief that is formed.   
 
§8 Questioning the Core Analogy (II)— Lemmas and Props 
So, is Norman’s process with (Square) epistemically relevantly similar to the process that 
Williamson describes when Norman is asked about the colour of recent volumes of 
Who’s Who?   
 There is an evident disanalogy. We can bring it out by focusing on the structure of 
the epistemic justification supporting Norman’s judgment. Compare the following triads:   
 
Who's Who i Norman's visual imagination of a volume of Who’s Who 
  ii Norman's judgment: all recent volumes of Who’s Who are red 
 iii The publishers of Who’s Who use the same colour for all the 
 volumes. 
 
Square  i Norman's realignment of a visually imagined square through 45  
   degrees 
  ii Norman's judgment: all squares are diamonds 
 iii The visualised square is stereotypical and any square may “in 
 principle” be reorientated in that way. 
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In each case proposition iii is an authenticity condition on the relevant warrant: a cogniser 
who doubted it could not rationally believe ii just on the basis of i.15  
While every epistemic warrant relies on a number of authenticity conditions, what 
makes the two we conditions we have singled out especially interesting is that they are 
crucial in underwriting the generality involved in Norman's judgment ii. They do so in the 
following way. If Norman doubted Who's Who iii, he could not rationally move to, or justify, 
the proposition (Who's Who) on the basis of the imaginative episode i that Williamson 
described. And if Norman doubted Square iii, he could not rationally move to, or justify, the 
proposition (Square) on the basis of the imaginative episode Square i.  
 Given that we are discussing the warrants for two general claims, and that the two 
authenticity conditions individuated underwrite the reliability of the respective generalization 
steps, one may expect that propositions iii are properly regarded as lemmas in the epistemic 
architecture of Norman's two judgements. That is, one may expect that they are propositions 
whose truth Norman needs some assurance about before he can justifiably take the 
imaginative processing described in the two i-components as grounding the generalisations 
those judgements make. Lemmas contrast with props, authenticity conditions for which 
independent reassurance need not to be demanded before one can warrantedly make the 
relevant judgment. For example, one might expect that a condition stating that Norman’s 
cognitive abilities are not impaired at the moment in which he makes the judgments would 
be a mere prop for Norman’s warrants. Suppose then, if only for the sake of the argument, 
that the two iii propositions are indeed lemmas.  
Now consider an evident difference between the two authenticity conditions: 
removing a doubt about Who's Who iii would require routine empirical investigation — a call 
to the publishers, a trip to the public library, other people's testimony, or whatever. By 
contrast, the assurance – if needed – that the visualised square is stereotypical and the 
process or reorientation always possible, at least “in principle”, requires no such 
investigation. On the contrary, by bottom-up standards, and although its grounds may seem 
mysterious in the present context, it’s an assurance that can be accomplished in stride and, 
intuitively, a priori— we find the point obvious on reflection.   
 Thus, if the status of the two iii- propositions is that of lemmas, the Williamsonian 
analogy breaks down. Part of the process of Norman's rationally persuading himself, by the 
relevant phenomenological exercises, that the two generalisations hold will be the attainment 
of independent assurances that the two lemmas hold, and at that point the claimed analogy 
will break down. On this account the appearance of analogy is indeed sustained only by the 
incompleteness of Williamson's style of description of the cognitive processing involved in 
the two cases. Supplementary information is needed before Norman can achieve knowledge 
of (Square) and of (Who's Who) in the kind of way described; and this supplementary 
information is empirical in the one case, but a priori in the other. 
 It is true, of course, that this way of making a distinction relies on the notion of 
apriority — on the claim that the needed lemma is a priori in the one case but in need of 
empirical confirmation in the other. Against a convinced sceptic about the intelligibility of 
any such distinction it is therefore dialectically ineffective. But Williamson, remember, is not 
                                                        
15 For the terminology of “authenticity conditions” and some discussion of the notion, see Wright (2007: 
29-30, 2014: 214ff), and Wright (2004: 191), where the notion was prefigured under the name of 
“presuppositions of cognitive projects”. Authenticity conditions coincide at least in extension with what 
Pryor (2012: 298) calls ‘anti-underminers’. 
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doubting that we do have a “bottom-up” distinction. So he can have no objection to a critic's 
appealing to it in order to explain a difference between cases that he is arguing are essentially 
similar.   
 But are the iii-propositions correctly regarded as lemmas?  Not all conditions a doubt 
about which would undermine justification of a certain kind for a claim are conditions for 
which independent reassurance needs to be demanded before one has such justification.  Any 
coherent epistemology has to reckon with conditions of this type — has to be, in 
contemporary terminology, liberal with respect to some such conditions.16 The hard question 
is which are the conditions – the potential underminers – which serve merely as background 
props and about which one can take a liberal view, and which are those which function as 
lemmas and for which the opposing conservative view is appropriate: the view that, in these 
cases at least, independent assurance must be part of any rational conviction about the truth 
of the target proposition acquired on the basis of a certain type of ground? In these terms, the 
analogy-breaker just outlined rests on a conservative view of the two iii- conditions.  What if 
Williamson were to counter by taking a liberal view—by proposing that the conditions 
concerned are merely props?   
 Well, the question, when in general to be liberal about authenticity conditions, or 
anti-underminers, and when to be conservative, is one we think that no one at present knows 
how to answer. But there is a case for thinking that a liberal view would be quite 
inappropriate in the case of (Who's Who). For suppose that, instead of a play within the visual 
imagination, Norman is presented with an actual token of a recent volume of Who’s Who, 
and an actual drawing of a square on a piece of paper. Surely this effects no relevant change 
in his epistemic position with respect to (Square) and (Who’s Who). He holds the paper in his 
hand, rotates it appropriately, and concludes as before that all squares are diamonds. He 
looks at the volume of Who’s Who and concludes as before that all recent volumes of Who’s 
Who are red.  In the latter case we surely must require that he have some independent reason 
to believe that the volume he is looking at is typical before he can be regarded as justifiably 
generalising. In the former case, it seems there is vanishingly small room for rational doubt 
that the ability of the square to present the two different aspects, depending on its orientation 
to the observer, is essential to it and may be safely attributed to squares in general. However 
that may be, epistemic responsibility seems quite clearly to require conservatism about the 
iii-condition in the perceived volume of Who's Who case. And that is enough to set up a 
dilemma. If we take the view that Norman does strictly need independent assurance that the 
presentation of distinct gestalten by the square that he has physically reoriented can be 
expected to be sustained by squares in general, still it doesn’t seem as though that 
reassurance needs to be secured empirically. But if we take the view that he needs no such 
independent assurance – that he may legitimately simply generalise from his experience with 
the paper square that he manipulates – then that is also a crucial distinction between the two 
cases.   
 In the concrete case, then, the analogy breaks down, one way or the other. Why 
would—how could—it make a relevant difference, then, if the relevant tokens are presented 
not in external experience, but in imagination?  Given Williamson’s reliance on the analogy 
                                                        
16 Cf. Pryor (2004: 356).  
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between online (perception) and offline (imagination) ways of coming to know, this would 
seem to be an especially pointed question.17  
 
§9 Coda—Learning from Imagination. 
As we have emphasised, we regard it as important for the interest of Williamson’s sceptical 
project that it avoid dependence upon externalist preconceptions about knowledge. In setting 
up the analogy, Williamson takes it for granted that the kind of imaginative processes he 
describes — processes involving experience in the more-than-merely-enabling but non-
evidential way — are indeed generally reliable across a range of bottom-up a priori and 
bottom-up a posteriori cases of which he intends his examples to be typical. Let that be so. It 
is notable that reliabilism would provide a framework in which, for the purposes of 
determining whether a certain procedure was generally knowledge-productive, the distinction 
between lemmas and props would be degraded: both alike would merely be conditions on the 
reliability of the procedure. It is tempting to speculate that the considerations gestured at in 
the preceding section are overlooked in Williamson’s account precisely because he is, 
implicitly, viewing Norman’s envisaged processes through reliabilist (or other externalist) 
lenses. 
 Be that as it may, the question remains: what is the source of the reliability in the two 
kinds of case? Is it relevantly similar?  
 Suppose Norman runs through the process that Williamson describes, and comes to 
the opinion, potentially knowledgeably in Williamson's view, that all recent copies of Who’s 
Who are red. Suppose we are somewhat incredulous, and ask him whether he remembers 
seeing any copies recently, and suppose, in accordance with Williamson's specification of the 
case, that he replies that he recollects no particular such episode. He insists that all he did 
was to visualise a specimen. What reason is there why we, or he, should place any credence 
in his flight of imagination? 
  Williamson’s answer may be found in §2 of his later paper, “Knowing by 
Imagining”.18 There he speculates that the imagination originally evolved as a useful means 
to alert our remote ancestors to potential dangers and opportunities, and argues that in order 
to serve that purpose well, it had to be both selective and reality-oriented. Supposing that 
such is the way in which it evolved, it is to be expected that imagination, in a wide range of 
circumstances, will be reliable enough to confer knowledge. 
 “But what”, we may ask, “about the evident possibility of wild and fanciful 
imaginative exercises of a broadly similar phenomenology to the epistemically worthwhile 
ones? What is to stop Norman freely imagining a pink polka-dotted edition of Who’s Who, 
unlike any ever produced, and then generalising from that?” Again, the later paper might 
offer an answer. Williamson proposes a distinction between voluntary and involuntary modes 
in which the imagination operates (§2), and appears to suggest, very roughly, that the 
knowledge-conferring episodes of imagination—as opposed to the fanciful ones—are those 
                                                        
17 That the analogy with ordinary cases of perception drives Williamson’s account of the epistemic role of 
the imagination is even clearer in his (2016), where he explicitly claims (p. 118) that the online and offline 
processes take the same input and deliver the same output by the same means, and differ only with respect 
to the sources of input (perception in one case, imagination in the other). Williamson stretches the analogy 
to the point of saying that scepticism about the epistemic role of imagination leads to scepticism about the 
epistemic role of online faculties (119).  
18 Williamson (2016) 
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in which, while the scenario from which the imaginative exercise begins (in our examples, 
the visualization of a crimson patch, or square, or of a recent copy of Who’s Who) is enacted 
voluntarily, the conclusion of the imaginative exercise (the recognition of the redness of the 
crimson patch and of the volume, or the diamond-shape of the square) unfolds involuntarily 
(§3). According to Williamson’s admittedly speculative story, “left to itself, the imagination 
develops the scenario in a reality oriented way, by default” (2016: 116).  
 A critic may be inclined to put pressure on this play with voluntary and involuntary 
aspects of imaginative exercises. How, for example, does it supply the materials to discount 
the epistemic significance of the kind of case when, in a daydream say, a vivid imaginary 
scene pops up, as it seems, wholly involuntarily?  But we shall not press such issues in this 
already lengthy review. Williamson’s evolutionary hypothesis is, after all, not implausible 
and there are, surely, many kinds of example where reliance on imagination does 
characteristically generate valuable information. The examples Williamson gives in his 
(2016) include knowledge of what would happen in hypothetical circumstances (§3), and 
some kinds of knowledge of the future, and of the past (§4). It is notable, however, that this 
later paper does not explicitly discuss the role of imagination in bottom-up a priori cases or 
attempt to apply the evolutionary hypothesis to account for its efficacy there. If it had, that 
would surely have marked the demise of any ambition that Williamson’s core thesis—that 
the contrast between a priori and a posteriori marks no deep or important distinction among 
different ways of knowing—should not rely upon externalist assumptions about knowledge. 
For the evolutionary story is externalist through-and-through. 
 There is, though, a salient and significant contrast in the grounds of the reliability of 
the imaginative process in the two kinds of case we have been concerned with. If we ask 
Norman why he believes that all squares are diamonds, and he replies that he imagined one 
and reoriented it in the imagination, we don’t in general feel any need whatever for an 
independent check on the credentials of this kind of process. Indeed, to feel the want of one 
would seem to betray a misunderstanding of what Norman has actually done. When the 
imaginative process is fully described, we too will find it fully convincing, for Norman’s 
routine with the imaginary square does not, as it were, bear a merely contingent and 
circumstantial relation to the truth of the proposition that it suggests. Indeed not only do we 
not, in basic a priori cases, require an independent check on the reliability of the processing 
in this way; it’s not clear in general how, if we did require it, the check might be 
accomplished. Perhaps the proposition in question might be one that allowed of independent 
proof. But that will not be the general run of cases. Alternatively we might check out the 
generalisation inductively; but the utterly convincing process in the imagination that 
underwrites the generalisation that all squares are diamonds creates a barrier to the 
intelligibility of the idea that an inductive check on the generalisation might disclose 
counterexamples.  
 None of that is true of the imaginative episode that convinces Norman of (Who’s 
Who). Even if we grant that Norman's phenomenological routine is essentially the same for 
both (Square) and (Who's Who), the reliability of the connection between what he does and 
the belief that he forms seems to have a quite different status in the two kinds of case: a 
difference which we can loosely summarize by saying that, in the (Who’s Who) case, any 
correlation between the process and the truth of the product is indeed contingent and 
circumstantial—exactly as it is represented as being by Williamson’s evolutionary 
speculations—whereas in the case of (Square) it is not. That of course is exactly the 
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difference we would expect if we were to regard what Norman does in the case of (Square) 
as a kind of informal proof of that proposition, and what he does in the case of (Who’s Who) 
as a merely experimental operation. To be clear: the reason why we should not think of the 
belief-forming process in (Who’s Who) as an informal proof is that the authenticity condition 
that concerns the generality of the putatively warranted claim is such that (a) it can only be 
checked empirically, and (ii) it seems to play the role of a lemma rather than that of a prop 
(so that the empirical check is needed before the relevant belief may count as warranted). 
It’s natural to conjecture, therefore, that the real difference of importance marked by 
the a priori/a posteriori distinction as drawn bottom-up is to be located at this point. There 
may well be methods of corroboration that one can execute in the mind's eye, as it were, 
whose products are, by bottom-up standards, ordinary a posteriori propositions. But their 
connection with the truth of those products will be contingent, circumstantial, and open to 
experimental corroboration. Not so with the relationship between a proof, even a “baby” 
proof, constituted by a simple informal routine in the imagination, and the truth of what is 
proved. In such cases, the relevant belief-forming processes are such that, if executed 
correctly, they guarantee a true outcome.   
 In his notes posthumously published as the Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics, Wittgenstein repeatedly returns to the question, what is the difference between 
a proof and an experiment? And his answer, roughly, is that the difference resides in the 
attitude we take to the relevant process. A majority, perhaps, will not much care for that 
answer, but the importance of the question for epistemology generally can hardly be doubted. 
It is an insight of Williamson’s discussion that some processes executed “in the head” can, in 
the right circumstances, provide experimental corroboration of ordinary empirical 
propositions concerning external matters. But that reflection does nothing to call into 
question the substance of the contrast between proving a proposition and experimentally 
confirming it. Perhaps a reminder is timely that it is that contrast that the traditional 
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